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The central tension in the movement for net neutrality – What allowing discrimination of data will mean for users and Internet Service Providers (ISP’s) and the need to balance it

Introduction

Network Neutrality proponents focus on the users of internet having absolute choice over the content they wish to consume over the internet and how they wish to consume such content[1]. The best case scenario for these proponents would arguably be the internet functioning as a ‘dumb pipe’, i.e. ISPs having no control over the data that is transmitted through their networks and systems. Unfortunately, from a technical standpoint, this is now a challenge with ISP’s gaining the ability to recognize the source of data flowing through their systems. Thus, the proponents advocate for regulation of ISPs so that they do not use this recognition to discriminate between the data sent to it by different applications and/or websites.

The tension

The main argument for the pressing need for regulation is that the ISPs have the incentive to discriminate between data from different applications and that general forces of market competition are inadequate to deal with this so called ‘evil’ incentive. Further, once it is established that the incentive exists, it is argued that such discrimination between applications will effectively end the foundation of internet as a promoter of innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth[2]. Apart from arguing that the ISPs have an incentive to discriminate, proponents also point towards certain real world examples where ISPs have already commenced discrimination. On the flipside, the ISPs argue that they do not have the incentive to discriminate as such discrimination coupled with the forces of market competition would ensure that such actions bring with it loss of customers and reduction in profits. Further, the ISPs discount the existing examples of discrimination as one-off incidents which were quickly fixed. The ISPs’ theory proposes that the internet has developed into a strong tool for economic growth with a hands-off policy approach and there are no new circumstances which merit a change in that approach now[3].

The main question and the clear answer

The question which has been the subject of the most debate, i.e. do ISPs have the incentive to discriminate between data has a clear answer. YES. The arguments forwarded by the proponents of Net Neutrality are quite convincing in this regard and ISPs may have numerous different incentives to discriminate between data in numerous different ways. This is one battle that the ISPs will lose. The ISPs’ argument that market forces disincentivize discrimination of data does not gain much traction in the US context where consumer choice between ISPs is limited and as a result, ISPs can be said to have market power. Once this primary question is answered as yes, the next question which arises is whether ISPs may be allowed to discriminate between data for certain legitimate purposes.

What the next inquiry should be

As things stand, the ISPs can discriminate between data for reasonable network management. Are there any other legitimate interests of ISPs which may warrant giving them some more leeway in discrimination? What about loss of revenues for ISPs which may translate into lack of incentive for them to invest in and deployment of faster networks? The problem of loss of revenues for ISPs due to the lack of control over data is specifically relevant in the US context considering traditional telephony services companies provide broadband services. It is well documented that the advent and growing popularity of internet messaging apps like Whatsapp and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) apps like Skype have led to considerable loss of revenues generated by wireless telephone companies through traditional calls and texts[4]. To put this into context, www.howtogeek.com, a popular online technology magazine carries an article titled ‘How to Eliminate SMS Fees and Text For Free’[5]. The article goes on to suggest that users use Whatsapp over unlimited data plans instead of texts. Are ISPs entitled to save their existing traditional revenue streams by discrimination of data sent by apps such as Whatsapp and skype? This is the question which needs as answer. Network Neutrality proponents suggest that sacrificing the openness of the internet to save ISPs from loss of revenues seems to be too big a price. While that may be true to a certain extent, the plight of the ISPs who cannot control data transmitted through its servers cannot be ignored altogether. It may be argued that ISPs not only discriminating to restore loss profits but they are discriminating to ensure the very survival of their traditional telephony services. It is reasonable to state that with the growing popularity of text messaging apps over the internet and VoIP apps, use of traditional channels has decreased and if the world would be to connected fully by the internet and the coverage of such internet is made absolute, the traditional calling and text messaging channels would be entirely extinct. The only thing keeping these services going at this stage is that internet connectivity covers limited geographical regions (which varies considerably by country). In this scenario, isn’t the incentive of ISPs in the US to improve network coverage and build better systems diminished?

Alternatives to an outright ban on discrimination of data

Considering the situation mentioned above, while an outright ban on discrimination of data may seem to be the best option to preserve network neutrality, it may be counter-productive in the long run. This is not to say that we don’t need network neutrality regulations but that such regulations need to be balanced to make sure ISPs continue to have strong incentives to build more robust systems and improve coverage, connectivity and speed. In this respect, one alternative which could massively help is opening up the broadband market to other individual players like in Europe[6]. This could help ensure that the natural market forces keep a check on ISPs abusing discriminatory powers. However, whether the market can be opened up or not is a larger debate outside the scope of this paper and it is conceded that this solution looks unlikely, mainly for other policy and political considerations.

Another alternative could be to put in place strong network neutrality laws and then incorporate some sort of a rulemaking process akin to the one employed by the US Copyright Office in the context of protecting the lawful uses that might be suppressed by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)’s anti-circumvention measures. Every three years the office conducts a rulemaking process to determine classes of works to be exempt from the DMCA. Similarly, the FCC could undertake a rulemaking process where it could seek petitions from ISPs for certain limited and closed schemes of discrimination of data to serve legitimate purposes and which do not unnecessarily affect network neutrality. However, the rulemaking process under DMCA has been plagued by inefficiencies over the years. Since 2000, the rulemaking process has gradually begun earlier and lasted longer. The longer the process lasts, the more time, staff and resources must be devoted to it and considering that this function of the Copyright Office is non-fee bearing and the fact that proposed exemptions will inevitably increase over time, is a concern. If proposed exemptions keep increasing at the same rate, the Copyright Office might be unable to sustain the existing rulemaking system[7]. A similar concern may arise if there were to be a rule making process for net neutrality issues and it would take considerable financial resources to make such a proposal effective.

Finally, some proponents of Network Neutrality have proposed that the ISPs should not be allowed to discriminate data and their legitimate problems of loss of profits and decrease in the incentive to develop better systems should be addressed by the government in the form of subsidies and support. While this could also be a viable option, from a political standpoint, it is tough to implement.

Conclusion

The problem of ISPs discriminating between data from different apps is definitely real and not just a hypothetical situation as ISPs put it. This has been substantiated recently by many new instances of such discrimination, for e.g. The Google Wallet issue. Therefore, the inquiry now needs to move on to whether ISPs should be given some room to discriminate between data to foster certain public interests such as building of better networks and how? If not, then how could the government ensure that net neutrality is protected without compromising on the aims and incentives of the ISPs to keep functioning at a high level. In this regard, it is important to explore the pros and cons of stringent network neutrality rules and weigh them against other alternatives to having these rules. An advantage that the US has at this stage is that very strong Network Neutrality rules have been adopted in some other countries such as Netherlands, India and Brazil and the study of the effect of strong rules in these countries might give some indication as to how efficient they are in promoting public interests of network neutrality as well as access to better and faster network systems.

 

[1] Barbara van Schewick and David Farber, Point/Counterpoint Network Neutrality Nuances, Viewpoints, February 2009

[2] Ibid.

[3] Verizon, Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless before the FCC, Verizon.com, January 14, 2010

[4] Erik Heinrich, Telecom companies count $386 billion in lost revenue to Skype, WhatsApp, others, Fortune, June 23, 2014, http://fortune.com/2014/06/23/telecom-companies-count-386-billion-in-lost-revenue-to-skype-whatsapp-others/

[5] Chris Hoffman, how to eliminate SMS and Text Fee for free, How to Geek, June 1, 2013, http://www.howtogeek.com/164395/how-to-eliminate-sms-fees-and-text-for-free/

[6] Neelie Kroes, Next steps on Net Neutrality – making sure you get champagne service if that’s what you’re paying for, European Commission, May 29, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/blog/netneutrality.html

[7] Sahil Yadav, DMCA’s encroachment on legitimate anti circumvention measures: Is there a solution?, IPslate, March 24, 2016, https://ipslate.wordpress.com/2016/03/24/dmcas-encroachment-on-legitimate-anti-circumvention-measures-is-there-a-solution/

Image courtesy: https://www.wired.com/2015/01/on-net-nuetrality-internet-freedom/

 

BRAND PERCEPTION

The Maruti Suzuki brand name is well known amongst the consumers in India well known for cars such as the Maruti 800, Alto, Wagon R and many more. In India, it has become the norm for first time buyers to buy a car from the Maruti stables. This has come about because Maruti’s ability to enable their cars to give a great mileage on cars which do not cost a hand or a leg.

However, consumers do not prefer to buy a Maruti car when they upgrade from their first car.  This is because in the minds of the consumer the Maruti brand has been associated with a brand which caters to those with less financial clout and cannot be a brand in the mould of a BMW or a Mercedes or even a Honda.

Maruti for long tried to break out of this “poor mans car” mould. However unable to do so, they recently came out with a new brand, “NEXA”. It was a name given to their new line of showrooms which kept high end Maruti cars. Additionally, they also advertised a much higher consumer experience than their normal showrooms catering to the consumer who was willing to pay a premium for his/ her car.

Additionally, Maruti have been advertising their TRANSFORMOTION campaign.  This commenced at the recently concluded Auto Expo at New Delhi. Transformotion, the new philosophy suggests transformation through motion, or the transformation of Maruti Suzuki through their core business, which revolves around automotive motion. Through the NEXA and the TRANSFORMOTION campaigns, Maruti a brand has tried to change its brand image in the eyes of the consumer.

Brands and marks denote quality. There also exists an impression that is created in the eyes of the consumer.  This image is what brand owners value the most. Any damage to this brand image is one which brand owners will not tolerate. Brans over a period of time get stuck with an image which they may find it hard to break out of. An APPLE computer or a phone for example  carry’s with an image of a premium product. Brands owners go out of their way with advertising and pricing to give their brand an image. However, the flip side of this is that the image may result in hampering the growth of the brand and in turn affect its sales as well.

Brand owners need to be careful to not only ensure that their brands are not disparaged but also to ensure that they create an image which will help them expand their business to all sections of society rather than be perceived as one which will caters to a certain section of society.

A LAYMAN’S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK REGISTRATION

Shreya Seth is an  associate with Seth Dua and Associates, Noida. An alumni of Symbiosis Law School, Noida she specializes In handling matters related to Intellectual Property


 

PARTICULARS AND TIMELINE FORM TO BE FILED PRESCRIBED FEES/STATUTORY FEES
STAGE 1

Filing of a new application.

 

 

A new application can be filed at any point of time when the Applicant decides to get the mark registered.

Form TM-1

 

 

 

Please note that a trademark application may be filed for a single class of goods or services and even for multiple classes in a single application (through Form TM-51).

 

For multi class application, it is recommend to file single class applications if the mark is to be registered for more than one class so that objections/opposition for one class doesn’t hinder the registration process of other class applications.

Rs 4000 per application per class is payable. The Applicant shall pay the statutory fees while filing Form TM-1. The mode of payment can be either cash or cheque. In case of the cheque, the Applicant shall draw a cheque of the requisite amount in favour of “Registrar of Trademarks”

 

 

 

STAGE 2

Examination

 

The second stage is that of Examination. Once an application is filed, it is examined by the Registrar of the Trademarks. During this stage, the mark is examined and an “Examination Report” with certain objections is issued by the Registry.

 

In certain cases there might be no objections and the Registrar may accept and advertise the mark of the Applicant as is in the Journal.

 

Generally, the Examination of an application takes around one (1) year from the date of filing of the application.

A reply to the Examination Report shall be filed within 30 days from receiving the said report. In order to expedite the registration process, it is recommended to file the reply to the Examination Report once the same becomes available on the website of the registry. There is no statutory fees for this stage.
STAGE 3

Advertisement

 

 

Once the mark is cleared of all the objections from the Trademarks Registry, it proceeds for advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal.

 

 

The Trademark Journal is open to the public and the purpose of advertisement is to invite any opposition to registration of the mark from any third party.

 

Once a mark is advertised and no oppositions are filed within the statutory time period  of 3 months which is extendable by 1 month (i.e a total of 4 months), the mark is then deemed to be registered.

Form TM-5 may be filed by any person who raises objection to the Registration of the mark of the Applicant after the same has been published in the Journal. Such is termed as a  Notice of Opposition.

 

 

 

 

In case a notice of opposition is received by the Applicant, a counter statement shall be filed within 2 months from the date of receipt of the notice by way of Form TM-6.

For the purpose of filing Form TM-5, Rs 2500 per form per application is payable.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For the purpose of filing a counter statement by way of Form TM-6, Rs 1000 per form per application is payable.

STAGE 4

REGISTRATION

 

Once the mark is clear from all the above stages, the mark is deemed to be registered.

 

Post Registration– A trademark once registered remains valid for 10 years. However, the same can also be renewed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Form TM-12 shall be filed in order to get the mark renewed. Form TM-12 may be filed at anytime not more than 6 months before the date of expiry of the mark.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For the purpose of filing Form TM-12, Rs 5,000 per form per application is payable.

SCHEME FOR FACILITATING START-UPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION (SIPP)

Shreya Seth is an  associate with Seth Dua and Associates, Noida. An alumni of Symbiosis Law School, Noida she specializes on handling matters related to Intellectual Property


I. Introduction

With the proliferation of start-ups in the recent times, and especially with the governments’ recent initiative to boost entrepreneurship, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry vide Notification dated 17.02.2016 defined the term “start up” to mean and include an entity, incorporated or registered in India not prior to five years, with annual turnover not exceeding INR 25 crores in any preceding financial year. It was further clarified by the notification dated 17.02.2016 that such an entity shall work towards innovation, development, deployment or commercialization of new products, processes or services driven by technology or intellectual property, provided that such entity is not formed by splitting up or reconstruction of a business already in existence. Thus any entity adhering to the above stated criteria will be termed as a “start-up”.

In view of the above, the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (CGPDTM), has published a “Scheme for Facilitating Start-UPs Intellectual Property Protection” (hereinafter referred to as “Scheme”), which provides for the implementation details of the proposal made in the action plan. Initially the scheme will run on a pilot basis for 1 year. The main aim and objective of SIPP is to promote and facilitate the protection of Patents, Trademarks and Designs of innovative start-ups.

II.  Who can seek protection under the Scheme  

Any entity which falls under the ambit of a “startup” (as defined in the notification dated 17.02.2016) and  has been certified by the Start-Up Certification Board as having an innovative business can seek benefit under the scheme.

 III. Implementation of the Scheme

For effective implementation, the Scheme provides for appointment of facilitators. The facilitators will be empanelled by the Controller General of Patent, Trademark and Design (CGPDTM) and shall be responsible for assisting and advising the start-ups on protection of different IPRs ranging from the filing to the registration of the same. The facilitators shall be remunerated by the Central Government through the Controller General of Patent, Trademark and Design (CGPDTM). The list of facilitators is now available on www.ipindia.nic.in

The Right to be Forgotten in EU – The Pre and Post-Costeja Judgment era and the attempt at codifying it under the General Data Protection Regulation, 2016

Introduction

The Right to Be Forgotten (“RTBF”) debate was first brought up in a suit filed by a Spanish Citizen, Mario Costeja González against Google in 2013. When an internet user entered Mr. González’s name on the Google Search Engine, he would obtain links to two pages of La Vanguardia’s newspaper on which an announcement mentioning Mr. González’s name appeared for a real­ estate auction connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of social security debts. As these attachment proceedings had been fully resolved for a number of years and that reference to them was entirely irrelevant, Mr. Gonzalez sought removal of these links from the Google Search Engine[1].

On May 13, 2014, the Court of the Justice of the European Union (ECJ) interpreted the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive (95 Directive) to the effect that Individuals have the right – where the information is inaccurate, irrelevant or excessive for the purposes of data processing – to ask search engines to delist links with personal information about them. Further, the ECJ also held that Search engines are controllers of personal data and thus can not escape its responsibilities before European law when handling personal data by saying it is a search engine[2].

This article discusses the glaring flaws in the Judgment and how those flaws have led to the improper administration of the RTBF and how Google has complied with this judgment in the past year. Despite of the flaws in the Judgment, this article advocates the need for a specifically defined and codified RTBF but a much better administered one. Further, this article analyzes how the General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 seeks to codify this right and its shortcomings.

The flaw with the ECJ Judgment

As mentioned earlier, the ECJ held that Search engines are controllers of personal data and thus can not escape its responsibilities before European law when handling personal data by saying it is a search engine. The definition of “controller” under Article 2 of the 95 Directive is “shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law[3]. This definition is important because the Article 12 of the 95 Directive[4] which houses the roots of the RTBF requires the controller to erase data which is inaccurate, irrelevant or excessive. The Court erred in holding Google to be a controller of personal data considering it has no knowledge of that data and does not exercise control over the data. The third-party website which upload the personal data on its website has much more control over the data compared to the search engine. The search engine does not, in principle, create any new data as it merely indexes it. Further, asking the search engine to delist a particular listing does not mean that the particular personal data is erased. The data will still remain at the original webpage. Hence, the person who publishes the content on the source web page, is in his capacity of controller liable for the personal data published on the page, is better able to fulfill the obligations places on the controller by the 95 Directive. The ECJ, however, looked at the technical difficulty of ruling in such a manner by holding that if the publisher is given the responsibility of removing personal data, it may be more complicated as the same piece of personal data may be published on multiple websites and some of those websites may end up falling outside the jurisdiction of the EU. The definition of a “controller” in the 95 directive is excessively broad and could include any user who downloads a particular piece of personal data as such a user would arguably determine the purpose and means of processing of personal data. In cases where a definition is so broad as to include many other unwanted situations, the Court ought to apply the proportionality principle and this principle ought to require that to the extent that a search engine provider acts purely as an intermediary, it should not be considered as the principal controller with regard to the content related processing of personal data that is taking place. If the Court would have followed these principles and declared a search engine not be a ‘controller’, the entire landscape of the RTBF would have been significantly different and the burden would have been placed on the publishers who actually publish the content. It seems that the ECJ has reached this conclusion as a matter of convenience because it seems more effective to ask one search engine to delist listings compared to asking multiple publishers to remove the personal data in question.

Improper administration of the RTBF due to the ECJ judgment and the statistics since

The fact that the 95 Directive was not drafted with the internet boom and search engines in the mind of the legislators and the ECJ’s judgment applying it to search engines has led to a framework which is vague and uncertain and makes administration of the RTBF difficult. For example, search engines are obligated to remove personal data which may be legal but is inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing. This is a vague standard and makes the job of search engines to determine what needs to be deleted very difficult. It puts search engines in a position where they either delete the requested listings and face expensive litigation. It also imposes a huge financial cost on them to review numerous requests for deletion of links. Although the ECJ noted in its decision that it is not likely to be a very popular procedure, within one year of the judgment having been passed, Google has received over 253,000 removal requests covering over 920, 000 links[5] and has removed roughly 40% of the requested links while it has rejected 60% of such requests on freedom of expression and other similar grounds. Requests from some countries such as France and Germany have fared better compared to requests from some of the companies such as the UK. In spite of Google confirming to the ECJ judgment proactively, the EU regulators have been more and more demanding of Google pressing Google to remove such listings from its .com search engine in addition to removing them from the region specific search engines. Very recently, Google has agreed to oblige to these demands by making sure listings are removed from the region specific search engine and are blocked from the .com search engine by using geo-blocking[6]. While it appears that the EU regulators are not even satisfied with this step claiming that geo-blocking can be easily circumvented by using proxy servers, it can be seen that Google is committed to working with EU regulators to figure out solutions.

Despite the flaws in ECJ’s judgment and the current framework, there is still need for the RTBF

As Google CEO Eric Schmidt told Wall Street Journal in an interview, every young person one day will be entitled automatically, to change his or her name on reaching adulthood in order to disown youthful hijinks stored on their friends’ social media sites[7]. More and more data will be collected about people in the internet age. In such a scenario, a new legal right is necessary to help people reclaim privacy that disappeared in recent years as a result of the Internet. After all, embarrassing information that once existed only as neighborhood gossip now follows people everywhere they go for many years[8]. Therefore, like convicts have the option of having their criminal records expunged after a period of time, people should have the right to have data which has become outdated and irrelevant expunged from the internet. What is required is a proper framework to administer the RTBF which is devised keeping the internet boom in mind.

Attempt at codifying the RTBF under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 2016

A reading of the RTBF part of the GDPR 2016 makes it clear that the right recognized in the ECJ Judgment has been expanded but the language is still vague and open to interpretation. The GDPR 2016 will make deleting online content even easier. Its right to be forgotten section nominally protects legitimate expression, but it also introduces disturbing rules that, in practice, will undermine that protection. For example, companies are supposed to take user content down immediately upon request, and review the legal allegation later.

The new right to be forgotten provisions do not make it clear if they would apply to Internet platforms in addition to search engines. Until regulators themselves speak up to clarify the law, cautious companies will hesitate to resist any removal requests[9]. Further, stringent and hefty fines have been prescribed in the GDPR 2016 for controllers of personal data who fail to follow the guidelines. To conclude, it is positive that the RTBF has been officially codified through the GDPR 2016. However, the problem is that the GDPR 2016’s combination of rigid procedural rules, unclear application to Internet platforms, and high fines will encourage Internet platforms to erase their users’ content — whether the law actually requires it or not. Before the GDPR 2016 is enforced, it would be worthwhile to revisit these issues and address them considering these Directives only get updated once a decade on average. Also, one is left thinking if the GDPR 2016 would have read as it does if the ECJ’s decision had declared searching engines not controllers of personal data.

[1] Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (es), Mario Costeja González, Case No. C-131/12, ECJ

[2] See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf

[3] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050

[4] Id.

[5] See http://www.pcworld.com/article/2922012/a-year-after-the-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-google-is-not-very-likely-to-forget-about-you.html

[6] See http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/11/google-finally-expands-europes-search-delisting-to-google-com-domain/

[7] Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Google and the Search for the Future, The Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2010, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704901104575423294099527212

[8] See http://fortune.com/2015/03/12/the-right-to-be-forgotten-from-google-forget-it-says-u-s-crowd/

[9] See http://www.politico.eu/article/right-to-be-forgotten-google-defense-data-protection-privacy/

Photo courtesy: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140522152917-24151045-right-to-be-forgotten

DMCA’s encroachment on legitimate anti circumvention measures: Is there a solution?

Digital Millennium Copyright Act and its purpose

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) was enacted by the US Government in 1998 to implement two World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) treaties and also equip US Copyright Law to cope with the digital revolution at the time with the advent of internet.

The main purpose behind DMCA was to prevent piracy by outlawing circumvention of digital measures to regulate access to copyrighted works. To ensure that DMCA does not unnecessarily encroach upon uses that do not amount to copyright infringement, it also includes certain acts of circumvention which have been exempted from the purview of the provision. These exemptions include reverse engineering, security testing, encryption research and law enforcement.

Central problem surrounding the DMCA today

While the DMCA has been used to prevent piracy, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) argues that it has increasingly been used to stifle competition and innovation. However, the central tension of the application of the DMCA can be traced to the fact that many anti-circumvention technologies have both infringing and non-infringing uses and when such an anti-circumvention technology is barred by the DMCA, questions are bound to arise on whether the DMCA has been rightly applied to prevent piracy or if it amounts to overreach to prevent non-infringing use under the Copyright Act. A fine balance needs to be struck here and this is the main tension surrounding the DMCA today. The best example to illustrate this problem is jailbreaking of iPhones. Apple places certain technological restrictions on its operating system found in its smartphones which ensures that only applications present on its own app store can be downloaded and installed on the smartphone and only modifications that are in-built in the operating system can be made by users. Jailbreaking allows users to download and install apps available outside Apple’s app store and make modification which have not been envisaged by the operating system. The problem is that while installing and downloading original third party apps which are not available on the app store and making modifications to the operating system, arguably do not fall under the purview of the Copyright Act and are non-infringing uses, jailbreaking also allows users to download and install pirated versions of apps available on the app store. While few will argue that it is proper to prevent anti-circumvention technologies which promote piracy, the problem arises when users’ freedom of being able to use third-party apps and modifications is curtailed. In an EFF report in 2008, it was found that an estimated 350,000 consumers had jailbroken their phones and utilized Cydia, an alternative to Apple’s app store that sells licensed apps that may otherwise be unavailable through official channels[1]. While there is no specific data available to show how many jailbroken iPhones are used to run pirated apps, it is clear that there are legitimate pro-copyright reasons for permitting jailbreaking.

 So how should one decide whether a technology that has both infringing and non-infringing uses ought to be barred under the DMCA?

Courts’ take on the issue of infringing and non-infringing uses

The question of whether an anti-circumvention technology that has both infringing and non-infringing uses ought to be outlawed was addressed by the Supreme Court of United States (SCOTUS) in 1984 where it held that Sony’s BETAMAX, a home video recording device which had both infringing and non-infringing uses was legal because of the presence of “substantial non-infringing uses”. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). However, it is worth noting that at the time of this decision, the DMCA did not exist. In a case subsequent to the enactment of the DMCA, the anti-circumvention technology in question was a software that allows users to make hard drive copies of copyrighted DVDs. RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Association, Inc., 2009 BL 170417. Real Networks, Inc., the Plaintiff, argued that its software, RealDVD, has substantial non-infringing uses as it allows consumers of DVDs to make back up copies which is protected by the fair use provision under the Copyright Act. However, the Court held that fair use is not a defense under the DMCA as it is the technology itself in issue and not copyright infringement. The Court ignored that the software had legitimate non-infringing uses. On balance, it seems that anti circumvention technologies that have both infringing and non-infringing uses will not find favor with the Courts and are likely to be declared contraband as things stand. This is disturbing as many anti-circumvention technologies that ought to be available to the public to make legitimate non-infringing uses will not be so available. What then is the solution?

Is DMCA’s rulemaking provision the savior for anti-circumvention technologies with non-infringing uses?

Under the DMCA, the United States Copyright Office was entrusted with protecting the lawful uses that might be suppressed by the DMCA and every three years the office conducts a rulemaking process to determine classes of works to be exempt from the DMCA[2]. The Copyright Office narrowly defined “classes of work” that could be exempted[3] and also required a high standard of harm to lawful uses of the work if circumvention was prohibited. However, in the rulemaking processes so far in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015, the Copyright Office’s interpretation of class of works has broadened[4]. Over the years, the rulemaking process has been used to exempt increasing classes of works from the DMCA ranging from two exceptions in the 2000 rule making to four in 2003 to six in 2006. The latest rulemaking process, the results of which were published fairly recently on October 28, 2015, exempted 10 anti circumvention measures and took into consideration the infringing and non-infringing uses of all of these technologies by taking into account real world data of how the technologies have been used. For instance, jailbreaking of iPhones which was discussed in the first part of this paper have been exempt from the DMCA as the Copyright Office found that the harm to lawful uses was far outweighed by infringing uses of the technology considering the right of users to use third-party legitimate apps and other modification tools was being infringed. However, jailbreaking of video game consoles was considered and rejected as the Copyright Office found that there are no significant non-infringing uses and that most users jailbreak video game consoles to download and use pirated copies of games. It is noteworthy to mention that EFF has been instrumental in pushing through a lot of these exemptions by filing amicus briefs in favor of these technologies.

The rulemaking process has been quite successful over the years and the Copyright Office has been able to exempt those technologies that have substantial non-infringing uses and have a real societal impact. As things stand, the rule making process seems to be the public’s best bet to push through legitimate anti circumvention technologies. However, the US Copyright Office needs some support in this regard. Since 2000, the rulemaking process has gradually begun earlier and lasted longer. The longer the process lasts, the more time, staff and resources must be devoted to it and considering that this function of the Copyright Office is non-fee bearing and the fact that proposed exemptions will inevitably increase over time, is a concern. If proposed exemptions keep increasing at the same rate, the Copyright Office might be unable to sustain the existing rulemaking system.

What are the solutions to tackle this problem?

While it is clear that the rule making process is definitely the savior for anti circumvention technologies with non-infringing uses, there are certain measures which could be taken to further make the rule making process more robust and well-equipped for the future. First of all, the DMCA requires some congressional intervention in the form of more permanent exemptions under the DMCA. The exemptions under the Act, as it stands, are very narrow and the congress could do the Copyright Office a favor by adding to the exemption list certain anti-circumvention technologies that have obvious non-infringing uses. It is true that the congress has made such efforts in the past but has not been able to transform bills into legislations. In 2010, Representative Boucher attempted to introduce a fair use exception to the DMCA but the bill failed[5]. It is time for the congress to support such bills so the burden on the Copyright Office can be reduced in the future. Another solution could be to form an independent body with its own budget and resources to carry out the rule making process under the DMCA. The congress has the power to form such a body under the Act itself.

The rulemaking process is the most important tools to fight encroachment of the DMCA on anti circumvention measure with non-infringing uses and it is time that congress lent a helping hand to the Copyright Office as such exception proposals are bound to increase exponentially in the future.

[1]See Erica Sadun, The Story Behind Cydia on the iPhone,ARs TECHNICA, Oct. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/journals/apple.ars/2008/1O/08/ the-story-behind-cydia-on-the-iphone

[2] See 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(C)

[3] Woodrow Neal Hartzog, Falling on Deaf Ears: Is the “Fail-Safe” Triennial Exemption Provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Effective in Protecting Fair Use?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 334 (2005)

[4]The Copyright Office’s Protection Of Fair Uses Under The Dmca: Why The Rulemaking Proceedings Might Be Unsustainable And Solutions
For Their Survival By Elizabeth F. Jackson*, 58 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 521 2010-2011

[5] see Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1123 (2007)

PHOTO COURTESY: ONLINEMAGAZINES.ORG

Draft national IPR policy : Gauging the sentiment in Washington D.C.

IP Slate comment: This brilliant guest guest post has been written by Seemantani Sharma. She is an Indian qualified IP lawyer currently based out of Washington D.C. She is set to join the Asia – Pacific Broadcasting Union (Kuala Lumpur) as its Legal Officer in April, 2016. She has been at the forefront of setting up the Indian Society of US Law and Policy in her capacity as the Deputy Director of the Indian Society of Global Law and Policy. She is the founder of Innovation, IP, Technology and Law, a blog on general intellectual property issues. For her complete professional profile, visit her Linkedin Profile.


BACKGROUND :

For any keen follower of India – U.S. IP relations (or rather standoff), it’s the time of the year to be on one’s toes. Just a couple of days back, the Global Intellectual Property Center of the U.S. Chambers of Commerce released its 4th Annual International IP Index  ranking India at a dismal 37 out of 38 countries on international best practices in IP law.

With the 2016 Special 301 Report due for release by April end, the USTR has been soliciting comments from the public. The comments seek to identify countries whose IP regimes function as trade impediments for U.S. corporations. For the timeline of the 2016 Special 301 Review, see here.

2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT AND THE DRAFT NATIONAL IPR POLICY :

In the  2014 Special 301 Report, India was designated as a Priority Watch List country with its IP regime subjected to heightened scrutiny through an Out- of- Cycle Review (OCR). This culminated in the constitution of the IPR Think Tank by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion( DIPP), Ministry of Commerce (Govt. of India).

The IPR Think Tank was constituted with the aim of reviewing India’s IPR regime. It’s stated objective being, “nurturing the IP culture and to address all of the IP system including legal, administrative and enforcement infrastructure, human resources, institutional support system and international dimensions.

Much has been written and spoken about in India about the Draft National IPR Policy and its attempt to reinforce India’s image as a strong investment destination. However, there has been rather scarce deliberation upon the mood prevailing amongst the Washingtonian lobbyists,  think tanks and not-for-profits vis-a-vis the Draft National IPR Policy. The clout that these organizations exert in determining the final outcome of the Special 301 Process cannot be underestimated.

Not delving into the merits of the Draft National IPR Policy, the author will highlight the prevalent sentiment amongst some of the prominent Washington D.C. based lobbyists, think tanks and quasi federal organizations.

ASSESSING THE MOOD IN WASHINGTON D.C. :

A cursory analysis of the comments received for the 2016 Special 301 Report indicates an unfavourable perception amongst the prominent trade groups (not to my surprise though!).

No attempt to highlight the comments of all the organizations has been made. Pertinent comments of some of them are –

Alliance for Fair Trade With India (ATFI) is a conglomeration of trade associations representing diverse U.S. industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to the recording industry (looking at its membership base, I would rather address the ATFI as a “cosy coterie”) . It primarily engages with U.S. policymakers on India’s IPR regime which function as trade and investment barriers for it’s members.

Denouncing the Draft National IPR Policy as bereft of any “substantive and measurable improvements”. it took a dig at the following issues –

  1. Weakness in the Indian Copyright system harming US creators.
  2. The usage of compulsory licenses.
  3. Heightened patentability criteria.
  4. Forced localization requirements.
  5. Lack of trade secret and test data protection.

Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), the largest trade organization representing the biotechnology sector in the U.S. and around the world acknowledged the steps taken by the Modi administration to engage in a dialogue with the U.S. on India’s IP regime.

Apart from making substantive objections, it  has expressed its dismay on following grounds –

  1. Failing to rationalize the need for a strong IP regime.
  2. Failing to address controversial issues particularly compulsory licenses.

Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC) of the U.S. Chambers of Commerce while recognising the willingness of the Modi Government to engage with the U.S. on IP matters noted that no concrete steps had been taken under the Draft National IPR Policy. It specifically raised objections to –

  1. Onerous patentability requirements.
  2. Absence of regulatory data and trade secret protection.
  3. Absence of unambiguous policy on issuance of compulsory licenses.
  4. Non – ratification to international treaties such as the WCT and the WPPT.   

The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) is the trade group representing the pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. While appreciating Modi administration’s commitment to a world class IP system, noted that translating this into concrete results as reflected in the Draft National IPR Policy remained a challenge. Specific objections with respect to the following were made –

  1. Restrictive patentability criteria in contravention of TRIPS.
  2. Weak patent enforcement.  
  3. Vagueness with respect to issuance of compulsory licenses.  

International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), the coalition of trade associations representing U.S. copyright-based industries lauded the positive steps taken under Modi’s auspices to improve India’s IP regime. It hoped for a voice in the National IPR Policy on the need to curb growing online copyright privacy and vestigial physical piracy affecting some sectors. Apart from raising objections on the following grounds, proposals on both enforcement and legislative sides were made.

  1. Pirate online services
  2. Illegal textbook copying business
  3. Illegal camcording networks
  4. Infringing cable operators

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC), the quasi Federal agency dealing with matters of trade in its Trade and Investment Policies Report noted the willingness taken by the Modi Government to engage with the U.S. on IP matters. Failure to enact new laws to address IP related trade barriers had not gone down well with the U.S. Government. Specific objections on following grounds were also raised –

  1. Absence of statutory protection for trade secrets and regulatory test data.
  2. Pessimism over issuance of compulsory licenses.
  3. Absence to identify patentability standards as an area in need for reform.
  4. High rate of counterfeiting and piracy.

CONCLUSION :

Going by the tenor of the submissions made to the USTR, the prevailing sentiment amongst the D.C. based lobbyists and quasi federal organisations is that though the Indian Government stood committed to improve its IP regime, the same was not reflected in  the Draft National IPR Policy. Hence, mandating India yet again to  be designated be as a Priority Watch List country.

( This is not to discount the fact that a few D.C. based public interest organizations such as the Public Citizen and the Knowledge Ecology International have supported India’s IP regime and its refusal to align with the U.S. corporate interests)

What needs to be seen is whether an Out – of – Cycle Review (OCR) is called for or not. Given the influence exerted by PhRMA, IIPA, GIPC, ATFI and BIO, there is a high likelihood of an Out – of – Cycle Review (OCR) being imposed by the USTR. (PhRMA, ATFI, BIO and GIPC has recommended for an OCR).

Perhaps the long awaited National IPR Policy, if favourable to U.S. trade interests could upgrade India’s status in the next year’s Special 301 Report.  Time only will tell! As an Indian IP lawyer, all I can hope for is that the National IPR Policy does not succumb to U.S. pressure.

Photo courtesy: businessinsider.in

Transactional negotiations and settlement negotiations – a comparative perspective

Background Before coming to Stanford to pursue a masters’ degree, I was a litigator in India. I mostly used to handle trademark, copyright, trade dress and internet law-related litigations filed on behalf of large multi-national companies against various big time and small time infringers of intellectual property. A large part of my job as a […]

JOLLY JOLLY BRAND STEALING

Tis the season to be jolly. Yet another Christmas is upon us. This is a season of happiness and joy. A season of brands. Shopping is central to everyone’s life’s at this season time. Naturally we are surrounded by brands and the media both print and visual media keep reminding us of the endless sales this season brings.

On a religious connotation, Christmas is related to the day that jesus was born. Santa Claus to whom numerous people relate Christmas does not have a religious connotation as such but is rather more of a marketing gimmick created around a man known as Saint Nicholos.

As per the law of trademarks in India, words and symbols of religious connotation or ones which are of the nature to hurt the religious sentiments of one section of the society are not to be registered as trademarks. It is only but common sense that no one person must have a legal monopoly right over such a name or a symbol.

To this end, I performed a search of the Trade Marks register using the online search tool available for the marks SANTA CLAUS and SANTA formative marks, CHRISTMAS and CHRISTMAS formative marks and JESUS and JESUS formative marks.

The results of the search are astounding and are shown below:

SR. NO. APPLICATION NO. CLASS MARK
1 783316 2 SANTA CLAUS
2. 2102239 17 SANTA
3. 1147814 24 SANTAS
4. 645199 24 SANTAS
5. 2055271 30 SANTA
6. 526152 33 SANTA CLAUS
7. 1819480 3 CHRISTMAS
8. 1849234 9 JESUS
9. 1849249 9 JESUS CALLS
10. 1849252 9 JESUS CALLS, PRAYING FOR THE WORLD
11. 1849235 16 JESUS CALLS
12. 1868098 25 JESUS
13. 1624703 41 JESUS CALLS
14. 1849233 45 JESUS CALLS
15. 1849247 45 JESUS CALLS
16. 1849250 45 JESUS CALLS, PRAYING FOR THE WORLD

As can be seen common words associated with the season of Christmas seems to have been registered by numerous parties. SANTA does not have a religious connotation, however the words CHRISTMAS and JESUS do. Additionally, it seems identical and similar marks have been registered by different parties and exist on the register. This would lead to consumer confusion even if the goods and services covered by them be different.

The Registry has made great strides in recent times to make the registration of trademarks more efficient and robust. However, the above clearly shows that more needs to be done especially in regards to the training of the Registry staff in legal nuances to prevent the above form happening. Additionally, to maintain the purity of the register, it is time that the Registry introduced a tool to enable them to search other classes in respect of identical and similar marks as well.

May the new year bring about more effective changes in the practice of trademark law in India.

…. V.C. Mathews